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HOBBES AND THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW
Claire Finkelstein*
INTRODUCTION
With the introduction, by John Austin, of the command theory of law,1 a
certain distinction among theories of law entered the jurisprudential
landscape: the distinction between theories that seek to characterize
obedience to law in terms of external motivations, such as sanctions for
noncompliance, and those that characterize obedience to law in terms of
internal motivations, such as a moral commitment or other sense of duty. In
the former category we might place not only Austin’s command theory, but
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s bad man “theory” of law, as well as what is
thought to be the granddaddy of them all, Thomas Hobbes’s authoritarian
approach to law and civil authority. In the latter category we might place
natural law theories, as well as positivistic theories like H.L.A. Hart’s that
ground the duty to obey the law in norms, or at least in normative practices
that treat law as reason-giving.
In this paper I shall argue that Hobbes has only been situated in the
former category through a mistaken reading of his theory, and that while it
may be true that Austin, and Holmes after him, acquired many elements of
their own theories from his, the “external” or sanction-based accounts they
developed do not owe as much to Hobbes’s own thinking about law as the
authors purporting to follow him supposed. In particular, while Hobbes’s
account of law differs significantly and in many crucial respects from
Hart’s, the central advance of Hart’s theory, namely combining a broadly
positivistic approach with the idea that law has an internal aspect, was
already present in Hobbes. It is not that I think Hobbes is uncontroversially
characterized as a positivist—indeed I have argued elsewhere that he is not.
It is rather that the positivistic elements of his account (those elements he
shared, for example, with Austin) did not preclude his recognition of true
legal duty with its attendant internal aspect.
The point may seem an arcane one for those more interested in
jurisprudential debates about the nature of law than in intellectual history.
But the Hobbesian theory of law, if understood in all of its complexity, has
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to Greg Hall
for comments and for assistance with research, and to Leo Katz and Ben Zipursky for
conversations on the topic of this essay.
1. See generally John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses
of the Study of Jurisprudence 13-16 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Noonday Press 1954) (1832).
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the potential to transform jurisprudential debates. For sanction-based
accounts are now, thanks to Hart, all but discredited, and that has left social
practice accounts as the only viable positivistic option. Hobbes’s theory of
law would thus suggest an alternative way in which central positivistic
notions could be combined with a full account of legal obligation.
Arguably, grounding the notion of legal obligation in the idea of a social
contract is neither positivistic nor naturalistic—it is a third way that the
better-attended-to attempts to explain legal duty as a normative social
practice, on the one hand, or moral duty, on the other, have eclipsed.
I. WHO IS HOBBESIAN MAN?
Hobbesian man is not a particularly nice fellow. He appears to be
entirely motivated by selfish ends, and has not a shred of fellow-feeling or
compassion for others. As soon as he finds himself in competition with one
of his peers, he will stop at nothing to undercut and even to destroy him.
As Hobbes writes, “[I]f any two men desire the same thing, which
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way
to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes
their delectation only, endeavour to destroy or subdue one another.”2
At first blush, these traits are a simple product of Hobbesian man’s focus
on survival, against the background of an extreme scarcity of resources and
anticipated aggression from others. Few people are altruistic and demur
when fighting for their lives. But on closer inspection, Hobbesian man
turns out to be even more of a rogue, since the provision of his basic bodily
needs often does not suffice to improve his temperament. Beyond securing
his physical well-being, he seeks his own advancement in a variety of other
ways. He is narcissistic and vain, and constantly craves flattery and power,
even beyond any benefit to his physical security. Hobbes writes,
[B]ecause there be some that tak[e] pleasure in contemplating their own
power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their
security requires, if others (that otherwise would be glad to be at ease
within modest bounds) should not by invasion increase their power, they
would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to
subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men
being necessary to a man’s conservation, it ought to be allowed him.3

As Hobbes points out, even those who do not seek self-aggrandizement
will be forced to pursue it by the unbridled ambitions of those who do. For
those with modest ambitions will not be satisfied to cede position and
power to those more powerful than they. Consequently they will be
inspired to vie for position with those who seek, above all else, to dominate
others. Thus even those who are not rotten to the core become moral

2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIII, ¶ 3 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1994) (1668) [hereinafter Leviathan].
3. Id. ch. XIII, ¶ 4 (footnote omitted).
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monsters when pressured by the need to keep pace with their more
avaricious peers.
Told thus, Hobbesian man looks to be very much the “bad man” Holmes
describes in The Path of the Law, “who cares only for the material
consequences which . . . knowledge [of the law] enables him to predict, not
as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”4 Law for the bad man
is a yoke around his neck that restrains him from various liberties he might
otherwise wish to enjoy. It also constrains his ability to benefit himself and
to further his various ends, including ends of survival and physical wellbeing. He has no sense of legal duty and would think nothing of violating
the law if he could do so with impunity. The only restraint on illegality is
the possibility of detection, which he would constantly weigh against the
potential for gain. As the oft-quoted passage from Holmes goes, “what
does [the notion of legal duty] mean to a bad man? Mainly . . . a prophecy
that if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable
consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money.”5
Or, to put matters in Hartian terms, the bad man adopts only an external
perspective on the law. He looks at law as a basis for predicting what
others will do—as a sign that they will behave according to the law’s
dictates. But the person who seizes the law’s internal aspect will look at
legal restrictions as a signal that he should behave in a certain way; it
provides him with a reason for behaving as the law demands.6
It is therefore unsurprising that commentators have seen Hobbes as a
Holmesian-style positivist and Leviathan as an early articulation of the
command theory of law. As Stephen Perry has written, “[I]f we are to
understand Holmes as advancing a theory of law at all, that theory is clearly
Hobbesian in character.”7 And presumably Perry would hold the reverse
true, namely that Hobbes’s theory of law is suited only for a character such
as the Homesian bad man. Another commentator, M.M. Goldsmith, claims
that “Hobbes is not only a command theorist but also a legal positivist,”
basing his argument primarily on the fact that Hobbes’s sovereign is not
himself subject to the law.8 Finally, Hart himself appears to subscribe to
this view of Hobbes, treating Hobbes as the originator of the view, followed

4. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897).
5. Id. at 461.
6. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 90 (2d ed. 1994). I do not mean to suggest that
any account of law that assumes the external perspective necessarily adopts a “bad man”
view of the law. But the converse seems quite clearly to be true, namely that a “bad man”
view of the law will be committed to adopting the external perspective on law, and hence
will be unable to account for law’s internal aspect.
7. Stephen R. Perry, Holmes Versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in The Path
of the Law and Its Influence 158, 175 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000).
8. M.M. Goldsmith, Hobbes on Law, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes 274
(Tom Sorrell ed., 1996), reprinted in Hobbes on Law 3, 4 (Claire Finkelstein ed., 2005).
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by Bentham and Austin, that the “present status [of legislation] as law . . . is
due to its recognition as law by the present sovereign.”9
But is Hobbesian man really guilty of the same external stance towards
his legal duties as Holmes’s bad man? Certainly there is reason to think so
if we restrict our focus to Hobbes’s best known remarks about civil law.
Most importantly, Hobbes says that “law in general is not counsel, but
command,”10 and the command of one who himself “is not subject to the
civil laws.”11 At another point he says that “all laws, written and unwritten,
have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth, that is to
say, from the will of the representative.”12 And further, he adds that
“before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some
coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their
covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they
expect by the breach of their covenant.”13 Hobbes is suggesting that the
concept of justice (and, we can extrapolate, of law) depends on the
existence of a sovereign empowered to inflict a harm for breach of covenant
that exceeds the gain to those contemplating a breach. Hobbes’s sovereign
is certainly thus empowered, since “nothing the sovereign representative
can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
injustice, or injury.”14 All the elements of the Austinian command theory
of law seem to be present in Hobbes—the command aspect of the theory,
the fact that the sovereign who issues the commands is above the law, and
the “bad man” motivations of the subjects toward whom law is directed.
Presumably this would have been Holmes’s theory too, had he cared to
articulate a theory of law in full detail.
Yet, as Perry himself notes, there is an important wrinkle to the parallel
between Holmes and Hobbes. The Holmesian bad man, according to Perry,
is only parametrically rational, meaning that he “sees the law as a force that
constrains him, and hence as something that is not in his interest, rather than
as a force that constrains him and everyone else, and hence as an institution
that might well be in his interest.”15 Thus while Hobbesian man is immoral
and selfish, Holmesian man is immoral, selfish, and dumb. He perceives
his interest only in the most immediate of terms and cannot understand that
advancing his long-term ends might require him to accept restrictions on his
liberty for the sake of generalizing those restrictions to others whose liberty
he would also like to have restricted. Holmesian man will thus bridle under
the constraints of legal authority, since his imagination is too limited to
perceive its restrictions as indirectly advancing his own aims. Hobbesian
man, by contrast, may fare better. For unlike Holmesian man, he can come

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

H.L.A. Hart, supra note 6, at 64.
Leviathan, supra note 2, ch. XXVI, ¶ 2.
Id. ch. XXVI, ¶ 6.
Id. ch. XXVI, ¶ 10.
Id. ch. XV, ¶ 3.
Id. ch. XXI, ¶ 7.
Perry, supra note 7, at 175.
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to understand that his selfish aims will be furthered by the constraints of
legal authority, and so he comes to accept law as a necessary evil for the
accomplishment of his ends. That is, he may be able to perceive that his
own freedom may achieve its greatest expanse when realized in the context
of restrictions on everyone’s freedom. This explains why Hobbesian man is
ultimately willing to enter into an agreement with his fellows to authorize a
sovereign to act on his behalf, despite the fact that this agreement requires
him to relinquish a portion of his natural rights.
But the fact that Hobbesian man has the capacity to use his reason to
recognize the benefits to himself of living in a regime of law does not
ensure his cooperation. For he is always in danger of slipping back into the
frame of mind of the Holmesian bad man, and thinking that he can do better
by shedding these constraints. After all, he may realize, he does not require
the application of any given law to himself in order for him to reap the
benefits of law more generally. He only requires its application to others,
and would do best were such restrictions to exempt only him. Hence the
agreement Hobbesian man makes with his fellows requires rigid, indeed
tyrannical enforcement. Hobbesian man’s obedience to the agreement can
be sustained only insofar as the enforcement is perfect and absolute. Thus
despite his greater sophistication about the need for law and the rationality
of submitting to authority more generally, Hobbesian man is still ultimately
in the position of the bad man in recognizing primarily sanction-based
reasons to obey the law. Or so the story goes.
II. A MORE COMPLICATED PICTURE
The wrinkle that Perry notes turns out to be only the tip of the iceberg,
however, as far as Hobbes’s theory goes. Matters are considerably more
complicated than this thumbnail sketch of Hobbes’s account of law would
suggest.
These complications have largely been overlooked by
commentators, for reasons that remain unclear. Austin’s apparent reception
of Hobbes as the forerunner of his own command theory may have
something to do with it. In what follows, I shall call into question most of
the elements of the foregoing picture—the Austinian/Holmesian equation of
legal obligation with legal compulsion, the positivistic account of law in
terms of command, and the idée fixe that Hobbes’s theory of law is
incompatible with the recognition of restrictions on the nature of law based
on the content, and not merely the pedigree, of such laws.16
Let us begin with Hobbes’s account of legal obligation. The first hint
that something is amiss with the standard picture becomes apparent from a
16. Ben Zipursky has pointed out to me that the Holmesian bad man view of the law is
arguably quite different from the Austinian command theory. It is, for example, entirely
possible that an Austinian command theorist thinks of law as imposing obligations, rather
than as merely obliging (to use the Hartian terminology). Although there is much reason to
suppose that John Austin himself did not see matters this way, there is nothing implicit in the
nature of a command theory that would commit one to taking the external perspective. The
distinctions between Holmes and Austin, however, do not particularly concern us here.
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more complete examination of the passage we considered earlier. In fact,
Hobbes does not just say that law is “command.” He goes on to add, “nor a
command of any man to any man, but only of him whose command is
addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him.”17 The full story about
legal obligation requires reference to a preexisting obligation: Subjects
have to obey the sovereign. The source of this obligation is the same
renunciation of right that we understood to constitute a condition on
obligation. The subjects are obligated to obey the sovereign because they
have obligated themselves to obey his commands, and they have done so in
the form of a commitment to their fellow man (rather than by committing
directly to the sovereign himself). It is not merely the fact that the
sovereign has the power to back up his commands with force and hence to
mandate compliance.
It appears, instead, that the subjects’ own
renunciation of right has given them an independent reason to adhere to the
sovereign’s commands, independent, that is, of the power he has to coerce
them.
What more can we say about the nature of that reason? After all,
Holmes’s bad man also has a reason to obey the law, namely the fear of
sanctions. From one perspective, sanction-based reasons are every bit as
internal as other kinds of reasons to obey the law, insofar as they are
considerations by which an agent is strongly and immediately motivated.
Indeed, arguably sanction-based accounts of legal obligation are more
internal than other accounts, because, unlike natural law accounts, they
deny that there can be reasons to obey the law that are wholly divorced
from what motivates an agent to act. A natural law account, by contrast,
could maintain that there are legal obligations by which an agent is left
entirely cold, since the motivation to obey the law is not a necessary part of
a natural law account of why the obligation obtains. This shows that we
need to be clearer about our use of the terms “internal” versus “external” in
this context.
When moral philosophers use these terms as applied to reasons for
acting, they typically mean to suggest that a consideration is an “internal
reason” if it is appropriately connected with elements of an agent’s current
set of motivations. A consideration is said to be an “external reason” if an
agent is wholly unmoved by it, and cannot be brought to be moved by it by
deliberation on elements of the agent’s motivational set.18 The distinction
between theories of legal obligation that see law as having an “internal
aspect” and those that do not, however, cuts across the foregoing
distinction. On the one hand, theories of law with an internal aspect may or
may not connect legal obligation with the motivations of legal subjects,
since arguably subjects can recognize legal rules as having a normative hold
on them without being particularly motivated to obey. On the other hand,

17. Leviathan, supra note 2, ch. XXVI, ¶ 2.
18. See generally Bernard Williams, Moral Luck:
(1981).

Philosophical Papers 1971-1980
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theories of law that are wholly “external” may nevertheless give legal
subjects internal reasons to conform their behavior to the law, since the law
may motivate them through the threat of sanctions. The distinction on
which we are currently focused—that between theories of law that give
subjects sanction-based reasons and those that give them reasons based on a
shared commitment to a larger normative structure to obey the law—is best
characterized as a split within internal reasons in the sense moral
philosophers have in mind.19
The idea of the “internal point of view,” as introduced by Hart, was
meant to capture the latter distinction, namely that between someone who
obeys the law because he fears the sanction, and someone who obeys the
law because he has internalized the normative structure that obligates him
to do so. It would be a distortion, Hart suggests, to think of the former
person as “obligated” to obey the law, just as it would be a distortion to
think of the person who hands his money over to a gunman because he fears
harm as having a duty to submit.20 This flawed picture is the model of legal
obligation we receive from Austin, and from Holmes presumably no less.
Hart calls it the “predictive” account of legal obligation,21 since on this
view we say a person is obligated to obey the law when we can make a
reliable prediction that if he does not he will be subject to sanctions. So
while the predictive account of legal obligation would posit that law gives
legal subjects internal reasons to obey the law, it would also present an
external account of the nature of legal obligation:
The fundamental objection is that the predictive interpretation obscures
the fact that, where rules exist, deviations from them are not merely
grounds for a prediction that hostile reactions will follow or that a court
will apply sanctions to those who break them, but are also a reason or
justification for such reaction and for applying the sanctions.22

And while Hart thinks that others are given a reason or justification to
apply a sanction if a person fails to obey a legal norm, he also appears to
think that the reason-giving force of law applies on the other side as well—
namely that the law gives individuals independent reasons for doing what
the law requires, and not just a basis for predicting that if they do not obey
they will receive a sanction. Hart’s account would be internal in both of the
senses we have considered.
What is defining of the internal aspect of law is that the relevant
participants in a legal system take what Hart calls a “critical reflective
attitude” towards the rules of the system. He writes,
What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to
certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that this should

19. Once again, however, the latter theory of legal obligation could be based on external,
rather than internal reasons.
20. See Hart, supra note 6, at 82.
21. Id. at 83-84.
22. Id. at 84.
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display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for
conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism and demands
are justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the
normative terminology of “ought”, “must”, and “should”, “right” and
“wrong”.23

The idea that law has an “internal aspect” can be articulated in any number
of ways. Hart’s idea that legal rules, like the rules of a game, have an
internal aspect when at least relevant persons in a legal system participate in
a shared practice of treating them as normatively binding is only one
possible version of that thesis. But all theories of law that treat legal
obligations as internal in this sense must somehow account for the fact that
participants in a legal system see themselves as normatively bound by legal
rules, rather than merely experiencing themselves as coerced into following
them. The reasons for acting that the law gives members of a legal system
must be identified by reference to a broader system of norms in a way that
immediate considerations of self-interest are not.
The question, then, is whether Hobbesian man has reasons of this
normative variety to obey the law, or whether Hobbesian reasons are
entirely lacking in internal aspect, as Austinian reasons might be. The first
and most obvious basis for thinking that Hobbesian reasons possess this
internal aspect is that Hobbesian subjects have reasons to be committed to
the system of norms from which particular laws take their authority, even if
the subjects lack such reasons for obeying particular laws themselves. Thus
recall that individuals in a state of nature can expect to fare significantly
better if they abandon a portion of their infinite right in favor of a sovereign
who abandons none of his. The reason they have to abandon this right and
enter into agreement with their fellows is also a reason to adhere to the
dictates of the sovereign, since the agreement contemplates adherence to the
sovereign’s will as the primary contractual condition. There are thus
extended reasons of self-interest for Hobbesian subjects to endorse a system
of law as a normative force in their lives, and this gives them a basis for
thinking of particular laws as having normative authority as well.
Notice that the bad man might also come to accept such extended reasons
of self-interest, given his motivations. If the bad man does not take himself
to have a reason to cooperate with his fellows, it is only that he is too
shortsighted to perceive the benefits to himself from doing so. But his
motivations are consistent with seeing himself as having reasons to
cooperate, and in might, therefore, be brought to see the value of selflimiting behavior of this sort. We might say, to borrow an idea from
Bernard Williams, that there is a sound deliberative route from the bad
man’s sanction-based reasons to the Hobbesian man’s somewhat broader
self-interested reasons.24 And thus while this extension of self-interest
gives Hobbesian man reasons of a normative variety to obey the law, these
23. Id. at 57.
24. Williams, supra note 18, at 104-05.
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reasons are only a step removed from the reasons of self-interest on which a
sanction-based theory of law typically builds.
Hobbes also traces several deeper connections between renunciation of
right required for any obligation and the obligation the law imposes. The
first such connection is a quasi-analytic one. In Chapter XIV of Leviathan,
Hobbes says that when a man has either renounced or transferred a right in
favor of another, “he [is] said to be Obliged or Bound not to hinder those to
whom such right is granted or abandoned from the benefit of it.”25 He says
further that “it is his Duty, not to make void that voluntary act of his own,
and that such hindrance is Injustice, and Injury, as being sine jure [without
right], the right being before renounced or transferred.”26 Hobbes then
makes the curious claim that just as it is an “absurdity to contradict what
one maintained in the beginning”27 in logic, “so in the world it is called
injustice and injury voluntarily to undo that which from the beginning he
had voluntarily done.”28 In other words, having authorized the sovereign to
act on one’s behalf by laying down a portion of right in his favor, it is now
an injustice (tantamount to a logical contradiction) to ignore that
authorization and defy his order. It is presumably not that a man is bound
under all circumstances to stick to his intentions once formed—that would
be too strong. But intention carries a special weight where others are
depending on one’s fidelity. Particularly in this situation, Hobbes suggests,
it is an injustice to fail to honor what one has promised to do.
These remarks come into clearer focus when we consider the account
Hobbes offers of the required authorization for civil authority. Legal
obligations are no different from other civil obligations, according to
Hobbes, in that they must be voluntarily imposed.29 Thus, if man in civil
society can be thought of as having true legal obligations, it must be that he
has in some sense imposed those obligations on himself. Indeed, it is this
feature, so crucial for understanding Hobbes’s theory of law, that
characterizes civil society as a whole. Hobbes goes so far as to define a
commonwealth as when
one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one
with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he

25. Leviathan, supra note 2, ch. XIV, ¶ 7.
26. Id. (footnote omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. True, it is in theory possible for a large number of individuals in a state of nature
forcibly to take away rights of a smaller number. And so one might suppose that loss of
right can occur by “conquest” as well. But first, Hobbes thinks that no one can permanently
amass enough power or establish a permanent enough confederacy to gain mastery over his
fellows in this way. “[T]he weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.” Id. ch.
XIII, ¶ 1. Second, it is not clear that Hobbes would consider loss of right “by conquest” a
loss of right at all. (This last point, however, is a tricky one, and more would need to be said
to show this.)
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may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient,
for their peace and common defense.30

Hobbes later concludes that when the sovereign makes laws for the
subjects, they have no grounds for complaint, since “every particular man is
author of all the sovereign doth; and consequently he that complaineth of
injury from his sovereign complaineth of that whereof he himself is
author.”31 Thus the first and clearest contrast with a “bad man” legal theory
is that law, for Hobbes, is imposed by subjects on themselves, and the
sovereign is only the intermediary or instrument through which this selfimposition takes place.
By implication, then, we can see that Hobbes’s explanation of the duty to
obey the law has an internal aspect of the sort Hart had in mind, and not just
the “externally” motivated reason a man has to obey the sovereign when he
fears the sanction if he does not obey. The possession by the sovereign of
the power to coerce is required in order for the reason to obey the law to
come into existence, since each man’s reason to obey the law is dependent
on every other man having the same reason. The content of the reason,
however, is not itself the threat of sanction, or the fact that there is a
sanction. The reason to obey the sovereign’s law is that doing so is
required by the social contract, the obligations of which each subject has
voluntarily assumed. Moreover, that voluntarily assumed obligation is not
an arbitrary commitment. The reason-giving force of the obligation is itself
supported by reason, insofar as reason dictates the commitment to the
contract in the first place (Hobbes’s second law of nature). Reason further
dictates that having once renounced a right by committing to contractual
provisions, those provisions must be observed (the third law of nature), as
we will see in the next part. Thus although it is fear of sanction that makes
it possible for men to advance their reasons in the context of a social
organization, fear of sanction does not of itself obligate, and so cannot by
itself be a reason for obeying the law.
III. THE FOOL’S CHALLENGE
We have seen that Hobbesian man has narrowly self-interested reasons to
authorize a sovereign to legislate on his behalf, provided that others do the
same. The rationality of each man’s submission to the sovereign thus
depends on the simultaneous submission of his peers. It is not surprising,
then, that at the beginning of Chapter XV Hobbes elevates the idea “that
men perform their covenants made”32 to a law of nature, that is, a “precept
or general rule, found out by reason”33 by which human beings are to
determine what it is that conduces to their own preservation. Hobbes calls

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. ch. XVII, ¶ 13 (emphasis omitted).
Id. ch. XVIII, ¶ 6.
Id. ch. XV, ¶ 1 (emphasis omitted).
Id. ch. XIV, ¶ 3.
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the third law of nature the “fountain and original of Justice.”34 For the
obligation to abide by the terms of the contract is the essence of the
obligations that man in a state of nature chooses to impose on himself. The
third law of nature is perhaps best conceived as a corollary of the selfimposed quality of civil authority.35
There is now a further question about Hobbesian reasons of self-interest
that must be addressed, namely how those reasons stack up against reasons
of obligation when they side with defection, rather than fidelity. While
reasons of self-interest, narrowly conceived, are sufficient to induce
Hobbesian man to enter into the authorization agreement in the first place,
they are not sufficiently motivating to ensure that he will adhere to the
agreement once formed. In particular, Hobbesian man realizes that
defection once others have already entered the agreement is less likely to
cast him back into the state of nature than refusal on his part to contract in
the first place. Thus, unlike when the initial agreement is made, it seems
possible to reap the benefits of others’ cooperation without having to stick
to the agreement oneself once in civil society. So what reason does
Hobbesian man have not to free-ride on the self-limitation of others and
defect from the agreement if one could expect to do better this way?
The story we told about authorization in the previous part does not
answer this question. For a subject could benefit from ignoring a command
of the sovereign even though such commands emanate from his own will.
This is borne out by the fact that the authorization story is presented in
Chapter XIV of Leviathan, but this objection appears in Chapter XV as a
challenge to the third law of nature. This is the objection that Hobbes
places in the mouth of the fool.
The fool’s challenge is that “every man’s conservation and contentment
being committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every man
might not do what he thought conduced thereunto, and therefore also to
make or not make, keep or not keep, covenants was not against reason,
when it conduced to one’s benefit.”36 That is, since the right of nature
entitles everyone to act as he thinks required for his own welfare and
benefit, there can be no general, natural rule of keeping covenants.
Whether covenants should be kept or not is entirely a function of whether it
would be in a person’s interest to keep them. The fool would not obey the
sovereign’s law out of a sense of obligation to his fellow man, nor because
of a strategic understanding that norms of reason sometimes require self-

34. Id. ch. XV, ¶ 2.
35. True, Hobbes makes clear, the sense in which keeping covenants should actually be
considered a rule of reason in the absence of civil society is quite limited, so that while “the
nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants, . . . the validity of covenants
begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them.”
Id. ch. XV, ¶ 3. The existence of a civil power merely specifies the conditions under which
the rule of reason that dictates the keeping of covenants can be given effect.
36. Id. ch. XV, ¶ 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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limitation, but only because he sees an immediate advantage to obeying.
The fool is essentially the Holmesian bad man.
What is Hobbes’s answer to the fool? First, he says that the fact that a
person may incidentally benefit from something that has a tendency to
undermine his own welfare does not mean that it was rational to do it (“that
when a man doth a thing which, notwithstanding anything can be foreseen
and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction[,] . . . yet such events do
not make it reasonably or wisely done”37). Second, a person who thinks it
rational to deceive others into cooperating with him cannot expect to reap
the benefits of cooperation, since he would have to count on others’
irrationality in order to claim their assistance. As Hobbes writes,
He, therefore, that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that
he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society
that unite themselves for peace and defence but by the error of them that
receive him; nor when he is received, be retained in it without seeing the
danger of their error . . . .”38

And no one can rationally count on others making a mistake of this sort,
especially because if one is rational oneself, one cannot attribute
irrationality to others, given the condition of equality in nature (“which
errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his
security”39). In other words, the fool is a fool to think he can advantage
himself by brute calculations of personal benefit. If he is rational, he will
see that he must attribute rationality to his fellows as well, and this
attribution commits him to making good on his agreement with others.
Perhaps this helps us to understand why Hobbes thinks violating the
contract involves a kind of logical contradiction. Having correctly
perceived his long-term benefit as lying in the decision to relinquish a
portion of his own right and authorize an omnipotent sovereign to act on his
behalf, Hobbesian man cannot now back out of that agreement without
contradicting his initial assumption that his fellow contractors are possessed
of rationality equal to his own. This shows that someone who reasoned like
the Holmesian bad man would ultimately fail to free himself from the
terrible tyranny of nature, if Hobbes’s account of that state is to be credited.
He tends to perceive only his own rationality, and is driven by his own
needs and wants either to respect or violate civil authority based solely on
the immediate advantages to himself of pursuing one course rather than
another. But if he were able to perceive the fact that rationality generalizes
to other subjects as well, he would be unable to think of his own possible
defection from the agreement as an exception to the contract. He would
thus be unable to exempt himself from its conditions, as he is at least
minimally aware that widespread defection from the contract will place him
back in the condition of nature.
37. Id. ch. XV, ¶ 5.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Whether Hobbes’s answer to the fool is successful remains unclear,
despite the wealth of commentary on this important portion of Leviathan.40
For our purposes the important point is that Hobbes thought he had an
answer to the fool, and thus thought that the “bad man” reasoning the fool
endorses could not be vindicated on rational principles. It is ironic, then,
that Hobbes’s successors came to see him as glorifying narrowly selfinterested reasoning in the domains of political and legal obligation. One
would have thought that the very name Hobbes bestowed on his infamous
bad man would have forestalled such misunderstanding on the part of
successive generations of commentators.
IV. IS HOBBES A POSITIVIST?
There is yet a second cluster of reasons to resist assimilating Hobbes with
Austin and Holmes on this topic, and this has to do with Hobbes’s account
of the sources of law. As we shall see, Hobbes goes beyond even Hart in
the degree to which he identifies law as a normative enterprise. The aspect
of Hobbes’s account we are about to explore is at least superficially
severable from the central features of his legal theory discussed until now.
And while it may be combined with the contractarian story we have just
told, it is not essential to a contractarian account of law.
The positivistic picture of law that contemporary analytic jurisprudence
inherits from Austin, and partially from Hart, suggests that anything with
the right sort of pedigree can count as law. In a command theory like
Austin’s, the point is easiest to see: While there may be formal restrictions
on what sorts of prescriptions can be commanded, and what sorts of
commands can be coerced, there is nothing to limit what can count as a law
based on the content of the prescription. The same is true for Hart. In
theory anything with the right generality and backed up by a social practice
in the right sort of way can count as law.41 While the freedom from
morality is the feature that most prominently separates positivistic from
natural law theories, one might less controversially identify the absence of
content-based restrictions as the dividing line between these two types of
theories.42
If we take content-based restrictions on law as the dividing line between
positivistic and natural law theories, there is a fair argument that Hobbes is
40. See, e.g., David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political
Theory of Thomas Hobbes 76-88 (1979); Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political
Theory 137-56 (1986); Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory
of Obligation (1957); David Gauthier, Three Against Justice: The Foole, the Sensible
Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd, in Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason 129, 13637 (1990).
41. I except from this Hart’s “minimum content of natural law” conditions from chapter
nine of The Concept of Law, which seem out of keeping with the theory of law that precedes
it. Hart, supra note 6, at 193-200.
42. This is especially helpful for making room for the possibility of “soft positivism,” as
it has recently been called, which Hart set out in the Postscript to The Concept of Law. Id. at
250-54.
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a natural law theorist, at least when it comes to positive law. First, in the
chapter on Civil Laws, there is the rather remarkable statement that “[t]he
law of nature and the civil law contain each other, and are of equal
extent.”43 Hobbes goes on to explain that the laws of nature, which are
justice, gratitude, and other moral virtues, are mere “qualities that dispose
They become laws once a
men to peace and to obedience.”44
commonwealth is formed. Hobbes thus appears to assume that the laws of
nature supply the content for the commands of the sovereign, and hence for
the civil laws generally. The sovereign, he seems to think, translates and
interprets the laws of nature, interpreting them and giving them definite
positive form.
There are other expressions of enthusiasm for natural law in Hobbes’s
writings, the most prominent surfacing in his furious attack on the notion of
precedent. This appears mostly in a short English work Hobbes wrote
called A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common
Laws of England.45 Here Hobbes calls into question Sir Edward Coke’s
idea that legal decision making is “an Artificial perfection of Reason gotten
by long Study, Observation, and Experience, and not of every Man’s
natural Reason.”46 Coke had defended the view that legal reasoning is
characterized by its reliance on the notion of precedent. Against precedent,
which Hobbes calls “custom,” Hobbes writes,
[A]s to the Authority you ascribe to Custome, I deny that any Custome of
its own Nature, can amount to the Authority of a Law: For if the Custom
be unreasonable, you must with all other Lawyers confess that is no Law,
but ought to be abolished; and if the Custom be reasonable, it is not the
Custom, but the Equity that makes it Law.47

Hobbes argues that there is never any reason to adhere to precedent. For if
the precedent case was wrongly decided, following it in the present case
would only perpetuate error. But if the precedent case was rightly decided,
we ought to be able to discover the same solution in the present case on the
basis of first principles, making the precedent case otiose. Thus, precedent
is either misleading or extraneous, and there is no justification for following
it. The question about Hobbes’s argument that will immediately present
itself, of course, is what measure he is using to determine whether a case is
rightly or wrongly decided other than precedent? In the Anglo-American
common law system, we do not suppose that we have a way of determining
the rightness or wrongness of a decision that is wholly divorced from the
relation of that decision to earlier similar decisions. Hobbes’s argument

43. Id. ch. XXVI, ¶ 8.
44. Id.
45. Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common
Laws of England (Joseph Cropsey ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1666) [hereinafter
Dialogue].
46. Id. at 61.
47. Id. at 96.
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here makes no sense unless he is supposing that a judge has something like
a natural law foundation for legal decision making.
We catch a glimpse of this in the very beginning of the Dialogue, where
Hobbes contrasts the “Artificial Reason” of the common law with “Natural”
reason, which is reasoning from first principles.48 Which first principles
should a judge use to decide cases? Hobbes does not give specifics. But in
many places he equates reason, or “right Reason,” with “Equity,” which he
explains as “a certain perfect Reason that interpreteth and amendeth the
Law written, it self being unwritten, and consisting in nothing else but right
Reason.”49 There is even some support for this in Leviathan, where
“equity” is presented as the eleventh law of nature, which Hobbes explains
thus:
[I]f a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the
law of nature that he deal equally between them . . . . The observance of
this law (from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason
belongeth to him) is called Equity . . . .50

Equity thus appears to be at once a quality of human beings, or of some
human beings, and a law of nature that human beings are obligated to
follow. We might conclude that Hobbes thinks judges have a combined
function: first, to deal equally with litigants, and second, to interpret the
written law generously, namely in such a way that supports what equality of
treatment requires.
Moreover in the Dialogue, Hobbes appears to be of the opinion that all
courts should be equity courts, and that the methods and more informal
mode of judging applied in those courts should be extended to all disputes.
Consistent with this preference for equity, Hobbes makes the astonishing
suggestion that bishops would be the best suited to be judges, because they
are men most likely to be skilled in dealing equitably among men: “The
Bishops commonly are the most able and rational Men, and obliged by their
profession to Study Equity, because it is the Law of God, and are therefore
capable of being Judges in a Court of Equity.”51 When the lawyer
challenges Hobbes by saying that bishops are not familiar with the
workings of statutes, Hobbes makes the still more surprising statement that
judges do not particularly require knowledge of statutes, as the lawyers for
the parties can inform a bishop as well as a judge learned in the law. The
general point is in fact well supported in other places in Leviathan, namely
the idea that judges should decide cases on the basis of equity, fairness, and
justice, rather than on the basis of artificial legal principles whose authority
stems only from tradition.
All this talk about equity should leave us rather puzzled: How does
Hobbes’s enthusiasm for equity square with the emphasis he places on
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 54.
Leviathan, supra note 2, ch. XV, ¶¶ 23-24.
Dialogue, supra note 45, at 99.
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authority and command elsewhere in his legal and political philosophy?
That is, if law is command, how can it also be right reason, or equity? The
emphasis on equity suggests that civil pronouncements can be disqualified
from counting as true civil law if their content cannot be defended as fair.
But the Hobbes of Leviathan repeatedly asserts that “nothing the sovereign
representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be
called injustice, or injury.”52 This fits well with a command theory of law,
since if the sovereign has unlimited authority, we would expect at least all
of his general commands to have the status of law. It also fits with a
contractarian approach to political legitimacy, since, as Hobbes goes on to
remind us in that same passage, the subjects are themselves author of
everything the sovereign does. But Hobbes’s views on equity do not appear
to fit well with either the command or the contractarian aspect of his legal
philosophy, especially as articulated in Leviathan. How can we reconcile
the more standard features of Hobbes’s account of law with his naturalistic
attack on the common law in the Dialogue?
The answer to this question is far from clear, especially as there are
precious few places where Hobbes says anything that squarely addresses
the problem. One test case for the conflict between the two perspectives
would be that of a sovereign who does something that violates natural law.
Would his commands still be law, as a positivist would probably assert, or
would Hobbes side with the natural lawyers who would say that a law that
violates natural law is “no law at all”?53
The closest we get to a discussion of this in Hobbes appears in his
consideration of the sovereign who condemns an innocent man to death. In
Chapter XXI, in discussing the killing of Uriah by David, Hobbes writes,
“For though the action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to
equity . . . , yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God.”54 The reason,
Hobbes explains, is that Uriah had given David the right to do whatever he
wanted to him, and thus Uriah could not regard himself as injured, despite
the fact that he was innocent. But Hobbes emphasizes that the action was
still iniquitous, and hence a sin against God. Hobbes thus appears to think
that the laws of nature bind the sovereign in foro interno, despite the fact
that there are no external constraints on the sovereign’s authority. If the
sovereign passes unjust laws, or laws that violate the duty of equity, those
commands are still laws, but they are iniquitous laws. Hobbes gives some
explanation for how that can be. In any dispute between himself and
another man, each person will naturally be partial to himself. If each man is
to serve as his own interpreter of the laws of nature, there can be no civil
law. Thus Hobbes suggests that each person must agree to take the
sovereign’s reason as his own, and to replace his own judgment with that of

52. Leviathan, supra note 2, ch. XXI, ¶ 7.
53. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, bk. one, no. 5 (Thomas Williams trans.,
Hacket Publ’g 1993) (395).
54. Leviathan, supra note 2, ch. XXI, ¶ 7.
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the sovereign. In this way, it is the sovereign’s reason, and the sovereign’s
alone, that will serve as the measure of right reason according to the laws of
nature.
What, then, is the position of a subject faced with a command of the
sovereign’s that violates the laws of nature? Is a subject confronted with
positive laws that violate natural laws still obligated to obey the former? It
remains unclear. The standard response would say that Hobbesian subjects
are bound to obey the sovereign, whatever he commands. After all, as we
have said, Hobbes is clear that the sovereign can do the subjects no “injury”
or “injustice.” But there are important passages that cut the other way. The
first and most important such passage is where Hobbes says that the
obligation of subjects to the sovereign is extinguished when the sovereign is
no longer able to protect them:
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long,
and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.
For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else
can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished.55

That is, Hobbes connects the limitation on the sovereign’s power to the
argument he makes for the inalienability of the right to self-defense.
Because it is against reason (under the laws of nature) for a subject to
transfer away his right to self-defense, the power of the sovereign (which
depends on authorization) is necessarily limited by the interests of the
If the sovereign’s dictates become
subjects in self-preservation.56
ineffectual with regard to that preservation, his authority over the subjects
ceases, and they are no longer obligated by reason to adhere to his
commands. Thus in the final analysis, if the sovereign’s commands do not
properly reflect the laws of nature, subjects are entitled to side with natural
reason over the sovereign’s commands. Here, Hobbes comes surprisingly
close to the Augustinian position on this question.57
What is important for our purposes about Hobbes’s appeal to natural
reason is that the subject is emphatically not in the position of the
Holmesian bad man with respect to legal duty. His relation to his
obligation to obey the law is not at all external, as it would be on a
sanctions-based view. It is rather emphatically internal—indeed so internal
that Hobbes seems to think a subject’s obligation to obey the law may
dissolve when the sovereign’s laws consistently fail to comport with
rational and moral duty.
I have not meant to convey the impression that I view Hobbes as a
natural law theorist. He is not, among other things, because the natural law
elements of his theory are subsidiary to the contractarian elements. Yet
both the role played by contractual authorization of the sovereign, and the
55. Id. ch. XXI, ¶ 21.
56. I discuss this point in greater length in Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle About Hobbes on
Self-Defense, 82 Pac. Phil. Q. 332 (2001).
57. See Augustine, supra note 53.
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emphasis Hobbes places on natural reason, point in the direction of a theory
of law that sees law as equipping agents with reasons for acting of a rather
robust sort. Moreover, Hobbes’s account of reasons for acting arguably
runs even deeper than it does for a theorist like Hart, since for Hart, social
practices can in and of themselves provide agents with reasons for acting,
virtually without regard to the moral defensibility of the practice itself. For
Hobbes, by contrast, the reasons are not themselves up for grabs; the
reasons for acting that positive law provides ultimately depend for their
normative status on the resonance between those laws and human
rationality. If, further, we focus our attention most squarely on the
contractarian aspect of Hobbes’s account of law, we have a model of how
law can have an internal aspect, as Hart was right to insist on, without
making use of either the notion of a normative social practice, on the one
hand, or the idea of a natural morality on the other.
In this essay, I have tried to present a number of reasons to question the
standard view of Hobbes as advancing an external, or sanctions-based legal
theory. By far the most significant of these comes from understanding the
way in which Hobbes sees all obligation as self-imposed, and the
implications of this central tenet for other aspects of Hobbes’s theory. If
the reason to adhere to legal rules is ultimately that they are voluntarily
assumed, then legal obligation cannot be explained without reference to
what Hart would have called law’s internal aspect. Understanding the role
of self-imposition in Hobbes’s legal and political theory also holds the
promise of transforming our understanding of Hobbes’s place in relation to
his successors. Could it be, for example, that in Hobbes’s idea that each
subject should think of himself as the author of all of the sovereign’s law,
we have the germ of the idea of self-legislation that is so central to Kant’s
ethics? Hobbesian subjects legislate for themselves through the person of
the sovereign. The source of their obligation to obey the law is thus
ultimately their own wills. Kantian subjects legislate for themselves in a
moral arena without intermediary. For both philosophers it is man’s own
reason that teaches him to be a source of law for himself—whether the law
is civil or moral in nature. Thus it may be Kant, rather than Austin, that is
the true successor to the Hobbesian theory of law.

